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Temporal FoundaTions in The 
ConsTruCTion oF hisTory: Two essays
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AbstrAct: The two essays included here are parts of a longer study of temporality, and the genesis 
of the “religious.” The first part, “multiple nows,” depicts a universe in which a present to past 
relation is establishable from any and every point in consciousness.  The resulting perspective 
differs from that offered by the linear timeline of chronological history. remembering where i 
put my glasses is an historicizing act, as fully as is remembering when the Battle of Zama was 
fought or who won there. on this alternate view of temporality the genesis of the historical 
perspective is the historicizing subject. The second essay, “The history of a house,” places the 
observer before an historical structure, then asks where the historicity in the structure is. we 
discover that the historicity is put there by the observer/subject. This discovery resembles our 
earlier discovery that historicity is generated by an infinite sequence of nows. The two essays 
converge on a description of historical cognition as subject-generated. 
Keywords: Temporality, history, knowing, subjectivity,  paiutes, monemvasia, historicity, truth, 
referent.  
inTroduCTion
The two essays which follow are interrelated parts of a longer study of time. The first 
essay, “multiple nows,” sketches a view of the relation of present to past which diverges 
sharply from that of linear history, with its assumption of a single past-to-present and 
present-to-past directionality. The view of “multiple nows” is of a free floating tempo-
rality, in which present and past are generated in infinitely diverse combinations when-
ever a new now establishes a past for itself, whenever an old now establishes a present 
for itself.  “The history of a house” pursues the same issue as “multiple nows.” This 
time we stand before an historical structure, a mediaeval house, and ask what about 
that object is its “historicity”? The answer is “nothing.” The historicity of the house is 
ascribed to it by the historian/perceiver who is standing before the house. 
Both of these “notes” on history portray aspects of a non linear, perceiver gener-
ated temporality. The second essay adds to this perspective, from a viewpoint which will 
become central to the larger work embracing these notes. The absence of temporality, 
from the house of part two, is understood as a negative, a potential for temporal/spatial 
“filling in,” which undergirds the historical object, the house. 
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essay 1
mulTiple nows
i will be several places today: waking in bed, in Barnes and noble drinking coffee; 
at the dining room table tonight.  each venue will be a now, a unique time view point 
from which a past and future extend.  From each of these three nows the history of, say, 
the paiute people--or of my left toenail, or of the cultivation of cloves in Zanzibar--de-
ploys itself differently, with a different tone, weight, thickness. There’s a different “tone” 
to each of these three historical deployments. if i direct attention to them, the paiutes 
will seem distant or near,  indifferent or touching, according to the light in which the 
moment presents them. i use the word seem with care. is the history of the paiutes really 
dependent on the mode in which it deploys itself from my now? seem can mean appear, 
in the sense of not be; he seems to be sick, but in fact he is faking. or seem can mean 
appear in the sense of come into appearance, become visible. That’s the sense in which 
paiute history will deploy itself as near or far, etc., will seem near or far. 
will the history of the paiutes be different at three different times today? That is 
the question here. Something in that history will not be different at three different times 
today. The “real chronology,” the paiute historical “timeline,”  will be the same in face of 
all three of today’s nows. or so it seems. But will that really be the case? will the time-
line really be the same at all three times? The sequence of facta that compose “paiute 
history” will be the same throughout the day despite the multiplication of nows from 
which paiute history deploys itself from me today? of course even that is not quite true. 
historical facta are forever being added and subtracted or redescribed: a new ming dy-
nasty palace adds itself to the timeline registry, thanks to the accident of a Beijing dig to 
prepare the olympic stadium; a piltdown forgery will be unmasked, leading to a rede-
scription of a sequence in prehistory; a new pottery sequence is discovered near danger 
Cave, and the paiute timeline is enriched.  Certain events in any historical timeline will 
be highlighted by certain interest groups: soviet russian historians will highlight the up-
rising of spartacus; american consular officials will keep Bury my heart at wounded 
Knee in a locked drawer.  Timeline debates--what goes where, what effect a given ad-
dition has--are the daily fodder of the classroom historian, and often modify historical 
sequences. By and large, though, the timeline is not subject to the kind of tonal or af-
fective account i mentioned above, by which paiute history takes on a different quality 
“according to the light in which the moment presents it.” 
Then what conception of the nature of history are we looking at here? are we look-
ing at two different kinds of history? Timeline history on the one hand, and on the other 
an affectively shaded history governed by the “multiple nows” we began with? will the 
timeliner deride affective history?  is not the affective historian--the timeliner will ask-
-opening up the search for historical reality, for wie es eigentlich gewesen, to a myriad 
of fragmented mini histories? doesn’t the multiple now perspective  undermine the key 
doctrine of chronology, the positing of a unitary past-to-present-to-future movement 
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in human  time? why should paiute history be affectively shaded, so that it is different 
tonight from what it is this morning? isn’t the construction of chronology the primary 
function  of thought within the temporal? To all of which, of course, the envisioner of 
alternative times has an answer. shouldn’t the timeliner have anticipated these attacks 
against an inherited temporal system which has nothing but the shaky (and often self-in-
terested) factor of institutional memory to give it ontological dignity? and once the door 
is opened to multiple nows, aren’t questions legitimately bound to pour forth? what 
kind of now does orthodox history presuppose, anyway? is this history always the same, 
whether deriving from the present, past, or future? if time can be fractured into the de-
ployment of multiple nows, can the rigid past-present-future linearity of the timeline be 
sustained? does it not now--on a newer perspective--become possible to imagine a now 
which is “deeper into the past” than the events deploying out from it; in other words, 
is it not possible to imagine a reversal of time’s arrows? (The Battle of Zama is not only 
the terminus of reflections from my chair this morning in iowa, but it is the genesis of 
new confidence and power in rome, and growing roman control over north africa.) 
Cannot the present be seen as the past of the past, the element that gives meaning to 
what was once the present, but is now itself called “the past.”? if so, don’t we open the 
door to yet another compromise of the timeline perspective? when we link the past to 
the existential condition of the knower, don’t we let the element of passion, or at least 
compassion, into the historical enterprise?  we are both the children and the parents of 
our pasts. There it is, truly, the affective dimension of a new multiple nows historiogra-
phy.  The implications of such a reversal of perspective are huge.
Time’s arrows
in cosmology there is dispute about whether time has a direction. is linear time a 
property of the natural world?  in the world of human affairs normal usage assumes that 
time is unidirectional. mesopotamian clay tablets customarily indicate the date in their 
past when they were made, as do paving stones in mount Vernon, iowa. school histo-
rians operate on the assumption that we who think of history are the alpha points of it. 
does the obsessive readiness, with which our answers fit the past-present-future time-
line implication, spring from the structure of the brain? is that readiness not itself a by-
product of self-interest? Can we really do what we played at describing in the previous 
paragraph; can we introduce a new historical map of time, an affective time? 
let’s see!
i’m writing a book about the history of the parthenon; plutarch’s comments about 
pericles’ building projects are part of the evidence i’m dealing with. starting to reread 
this old modern library edition of plutarch is the beginning of a chain of pursuits in the 
mind which will lead me farther “back into the past,” and then again pull me “farther 
up toward the present.” i am here/now; plutarch  is “back there” commenting on peri-
cles; pericles is even farther “back there.”  look at the way my present now has generated 
another now, that of plutarch looking back. plutarch was looking back through tradi-
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tional historical glosses furnished by his time. That looking back was part of his now. 
and recognizing that is the point where we must start re-evaluating the directionalities 
of the entire historical process. in fact we are into more than geometrical reversals now. 
we have to ask ourselves a fraught question about active and passive roles in historical 
thinking.  was pericles the passive and reified object of plutarch’s historical glance?  am 
i under plutarch’s scrutiny? do passive and reified properly describe the kinds of pres-
ence once living actors assume in the historical web? historical dating
The issue of historical dating, implicit in my history of the parthenon, springs out 
at me. what is a date? how and why do we assign them? i telephone an old historian 
friend.   i ask him how to find out more about the history of historical dating. my friend 
refers me to a colleague who is an expert on mesopotamian history and its dating prac-
tices. i speak by phone with her, and “learn a lot”; i am still thinking back to the time 
scale she provides me. in the midst of trying to understand her i remember what my wife 
said yesterday morning: don’t forget to buy milk. i had forgotten. i entertain this obliga-
tion even while discussing assur bani a pal, even while trying to remember whether my 
wife’s request or the professor’s information came first.  each of these products of histori-
cal memory addresses me existentially this morning. my friend himself becomes for me 
this morning in a fresh now; so does his colleague, so does my wife, so does assur bani 
a pal.  The now in question is a schein, a cropping up, in which a certain historical past 
lives. of each of those croppings up it is relevant to say, as i did of pericles, that it en-
gages in a reciprocal relation with my identity that knows it; as well as with a vast cross 
section of collateral “historical events,” which i frequently know along with it.   (ashur 
bani apal has, as part of this network,  acquired a fresh relationship to my wife’s com-
ment about coffee.) historical “dates” begin to seem like participants in a transhistori-
cal, causality-free lattice work, which knows no past. 
possiBiliTies
possibility: 1) time’s arrows may move in two directions, backward toward the past, 
or from the past toward the present; 2)  past, present, and future are terms without stable 
referents, the past coming under consideration as a present, the future as a past, as it be-
comes part of an actuality in, say, a present which can be viewed from the past, as plu-
tarch can be “read by” pericles, i by plutarch, and my grandson by me.  possibility: 3) 
the temporal element is in some way illusory, or compacts itself into an identity in which 
past, present, and future lose their time-layering functions. 
aFFeCTiVe Time’s landsCape
welcome to the topography of affective time--its landmarks, distancings, black holes, 
energy zones. we start to see through new lenses, as did Galileo when he looked at the 
mountains of the moon  through the thirty magnification lens he made from cast-off 
tubing. our lenses disclose new landmarks: from the construction of the Great pyra-
mid, to a night at Christmas with the flu, to the memory of a record playing “strangers 
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in the night.” each now reads the others.  The past, or shall we say the present created 
by memory,  is crowded with historical inceptions. in The Past is a Foreign Country, david 
lowenthal surveys the ways his multi-nowed past pervades the present. we all live with 
the past at every moment. Between us attending to it, and the neolithic cave painting 
of the sorcerer of the dordogne, six thousand years evaporate in a puff. perceiver-per-
ceived relationships somersault over one another.  macchu picchu, eight hundred years 
old, is taking a picture of me among the Japanese camera crew who came to photograph 
it.  The history of my left foot or the history of your arthritis have lived us, you might 
say, for some time now. nor is the past simply crowded, so crowded that at some times 
it seems there is no room left for us. 
affective history is a landscape pitted and scarred and humped beyond description. 
The roman victory at the Battle of Zama will filter to me distantly through memory 
like the light from another galaxy;  this event will be the barest foothill in my affective 
time/space.  Zama rarely lives me. The sorrow of the loss of my dog looms like a moun-
tain in any twist of historical light. my humiliation, at forgetting the perfect of the Greek 
verb luo in a sunny morning class at dartmouth, stays. 
dimensions oF passion
To approach a multi- directional flow of time, parting that fabric’s web from the far 
as well as the near side, reflecting on time as a being-made chronon as well as a fait ac-
compli, is to suffer with the outflowering flow of time, as well as to wonder at the vast-
ness of what has become in time. To cast your eyes over time’s valences is to feel the 
huge asynchronous inner web of the temporal which is driving you into the corner of the 
instant, then opening through you from that instant.  in your disclosure to the power of 
the past, with which you are at every instant inter-creating, your compassion  is driven 
into the open, as it can never be in a survey of chrona linking past to future by a causal 
chain. which is not to say that the causalists Gibbon or prescott do not shed compas-
sionate understanding onto vast swathes of chronology; but that they do so from within 
their perspective;  in which though the past is over and done with, the historian’s mag-
nanimity accords new life to all it touches. 
***
 heading into the desert, somewhere east of Tonopah, my archeologist friend sam 
starts to discuss paiute history.  he talks of weaponry, basketry, burial practices, and 
language deposits. he will do his best, he says, to give substance to the empty spaces on 
the map, and on the map of history.  he will introduce me to paiute skills easy to master 
in retrospect, but which, like all skills, will when seen from the far-side-approaching-us 
have to be viewed as considerable achievements; especially when those skills have to be ex-
ercised in a bone dry desert, with limited tools, and on a skimpy wild life supply.  “By 
1500 B.C.,” sam says, “bow-making technology was underway. For the best of bows the 
paiutes would pick a short piece of mountain juniper, three or four feet in length”--he il-
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lustrates with his hands--“backed with sinew. To attach the backing they had to have at 
least rough scrapers, grinding stones, and some sharpened adze blades. different tech-
nologies, from different periods, came together at 1500 B.C., just at the point of crea-
tion of this bow.  This bow is a point of historical intersection,” he continues, “at which 
a variety of skills were joined. look how much more becomes possible, when you get to 
this stage of construction.  you can make a strongly graspable elliptical handgrip, bow 
tips curved backwards a half inch til they slot into the nocks. and then, and then…” at 
this point sam starts in on the issue of the wood itself. he tells me that, once the bow 
wood had been fastened by cords to another wood piece, to hold it firm, the bow-wood 
was put aside in a dark, dry corner, where it might remain for months or even years. 
sometime around 1000 a.d. this curing technique reached perfection. i am all ears! i 
look at the man closely!
sam may think i need to be convinced of the truth of his facts. maybe he’s that kind 
of historian, convinced that he’s the responsible guardian of a verifiable truth. But in fact 
i’m not questioning his truth. i don’t care about his truth. rather i yield to his detail. 
i’m ready to concede accuracy to his account of the bow-making process, no contest; it 
all did happen once, and he knows something about what happened and when it hap-
pened. sam seems relieved to hear my yielding, as though somehow the new affective 
view of history, which he knows i am trying out on him, would be put to rest by the 
introduction into his historical account of time-depth and precision. But he has noth-
ing to fear from me on that score. i am not seeking a new depth of any kind, to which 
i should think him a poor guide. nothing of the sort. i am in no way fretting at some 
supposed shallowness  or vagueness in sam. isn’t he, after all,  responsibly historicizing 
the paiutes, trying for completeness, exhausting the factum? 
What I most want is freedom from the claustrophobic “to be repeated” of  human time. 
Time as closed circuit maddens me! That’s why I smile whenever Sam steps around to 
the rear of  the time dog,  rubbing the nap from past to present, making me glimpse 
aspects of  atlatls or bows in the making.  Even that rubbing-tidbit isn’t enough for me. 
It turns out I want more than just a sense of  the inner texture of  temporality. I want 
the affective integument of  the historical. I am hungry for the emptinesses of  time, 
as well as for its date-laden corpus.   Emptiness seems to me the internal ally of  the 
hard work of  making history. 
Vast limits of  time
As I absorb, then wander in mind to the rear of  the atlatl event, as I try to 
imagine the process of diffusion that brought this innovation within range of  Paiute 
practice, and greatly increased the tribe’s hunting yield, I think; what narrow words 
Sam the archeologist and I are spreading on the wind. What are these vast sums of  time, 
and these ingenious inventions the Paiutes employ into the winds of  their future? 
We can begin to answer by regressing in mind, from us back to the atlatl. We can 
do the atlatl backwards, starting from that rudimentary bow, then going further 
“backwards.” We can give ourselves the sense that in this “regressing” we are filling 
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some of  the “gaps in our timeline.” We can proceed “backwards” to basketry and 
grinding stones and trace elements of  linguistic development; we can thus fill our 
time, between Logan and Salt Lake City. And we will be doing what, if  I correctly 
interpret my friend? We will be working back and forth across arid maps full of  
names and numbers, ascribing predictable arrows of  past-present energy. But will 
we be confronting the emptiness of  historical time?
“I’m going to let you carry me back,” I say to Sam,  “arrow by arrow, to the point 
where, well, we “know nothing”…beyond Danger Cave, beyond the atlatl, to the brink, 
going “back,” of  eventless time, which is simply time for which there is no tangible record, 
into which no, or almost no, data can be inserted, or only enough to ensure us that the 
Paiutes (say) were still there, as though we had any doubt…I can see, I believe, that even 
when I stroll with you back to 6000 B.C., the “date” of  a cave like that of  the painting of  the 
Sorcerer of  the Dordogne, I will, well, not have gotten anywhere beyond the lip of, well…”
 I am not chafing only at the “to be repeated” but at the entire realm of  quantity, and 
Sam knows it.  He hits me broadsides. “You say you’re only looking for a new way to honor 
history, and to let the words of  our mouths recite the deeds of  our past? You’re going to fit 
me out with a new system for achieving that? I suspect your revisionism is the work of  a 
poet, not much more than a remapping metaphor.” 
He goes on to talk about the realm of  quantity and its devotees. He mocks me. I flare 
up. “My solidarity with the Paiutes, from my friend the mailman Dave back through the 
banishment to the Reservation sites one hundred fifty years ago, from there back to”…and 
suddenly I realize that I am answering him in his own terms. I need to put my speech where 
my thinking has been. “Sam,” I say, “the square kind of  speech you historians thrive on is 
nothing speech…it is words--mind you I’m not challenging the fit of  language to reality-
-it is words aligned stringently along a string of  date beads, it is words taking each event 
as a factum, without its history and its futurity in it. It is a hollow pretence at depth and a 
simplification  of  the arrow of  time…”
I grow breathless!
Hardees? Why not?
                      
***
FigHTiNg BaCk: WHaT i THiNk
i
Affective history is a malleable gel, in which there are as many nows as there are conscious humans 
living in an event world. When are those nows? Are they affixed to the moments in which they were 
actively being nows? Does the death of  a consciousness that was a lifetime of  nows eradicate those 
nows? Or are those nows inscribed in “the nature of  things”’ All these questions pour forth.  One 
goes too far, too fast, with the issue of  nows. But the issue is that rich. Or richer. Now’s imply then’s. 
This implication has a “spatial” element to it, for we tend to track temporal regress in spatial terms. 
“Then” suggest “back there.”  (This is the basic process of  timelining, which is a string of  beads 
concept, going from here to back there.) We should resist this spatialization, even while using it, for 
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it disfigures the character of  temporal experience.
When we bring the affective perspective to bear on the history of  the Paiutes, we find it equal to the 
number of  consciousnesses times the number of  elapsed instances operative as the Paiute now-field. 
Only an infinitely small number of  those conditions of  awareness will be non-trivial; those of  Sam 
and me, for instance, being among the rare cases. Such an account is a far more precise symbolic 
equivalent, to Paiute history, than is the timeline chronometer, which postulates a universal now and 
a universal then. 
ii
Has time a direction? If  so, where does its arrow point? Cosmologists dispute the question. It is 
imaginable that physical time moves both backward and forward. Psychological time can move both 
backwards and forwards. We can dawdle into the past or actively recover the past. We can fill the 
present with the anxieties and dreams of  the future. But the time under discussion here, affective 
historical time, is distinct from psychological time. We are discussing a time as real as the time of  
physics or psychology. The time we are discussing is medium and occupant of  a unique realm of  
variable past-present relationships. This time is susceptible to diverse directional arrows. You, Sam, 
have showed me both directions in talking about the bow. You discussed this weapon from the stand 
point of  a self  looking back; you also invited me to consider the procedure of  making the bow--and 
it was through that aperture that I saw to the bi-directional movement that appears to regulate the 
“flow of  time.” 
iii
Affective time is graspable as a whole, but not as the “historical whole” understood in chronometric 
history. The great system thinkers in the philosophy of  history--Vico, Spengler, Toynbee--have 
sought to embrace the totality of  the human experience. Affective time presents a different kind of  
challenge to the holistic thinker; he/she must factor in a mathematical dimension, a calculus of  
the multiple relationships between any nower/knower and the past, a flexibility to include the bi- 
directional character of  time. He/she must have some  susceptibility to geometrical relations, as they 
play out in transhistorical relations. But the skill set required of  the affective time historian is not 
formalistic; he/she must be able to appreciate, inside the calculus of  relationships, the privileged, 
the indifferent, and the meaningless/null category of  juxtapositions.
I wimped out
What Sam thought of  this Hardees mini- history I was never to know, for our trip 
pressed us forward; Salt Lake City by midnight! Furthermore Sam was tired. He had offered 
me, slyly, a whole compendium of  informational accesses to the history of  the Paiute people. 
I had only just let him get into the bow issue, a bit of  the atlatl, then I had wimped--on 
linguistic traces, normally my forte, basketry, ho hummh, and sherds, yawn. It was not good 
of  me. But as you see, I have disengaged a concealed motive for my waywardness. I have a 
new way to look at history.
“Let me tell me you a personal story, Sam. Twenty years ago I went to British Honduras. 
I took transportation in the back of  a fruit van, with fifteen others, and for twenty four 
hours we rattled along the coastal road. We visited every pothole we could, we fell in and 
out of  sleep, and eventually we came to a river we couldn’t cross. Recent flooding. So the 
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driver shoveled us out onto the roadside about ten kilometers from Stanns Creek. We started 
walking, moms and kids and some itinerant fruit pickers from the North. It was a desolate 
moment, still before six in the morning, only a trace of  sun on the muggy horizon, mosquitoes 
breeding in our faces, the works. It was a little after seven when we got into Stanns Creek. 
When I was young I used to dream of  travel, as a way of  adding place names to the list of  
my experiences. I was a middle class experience freak. On my first trip to Europe, as a teen 
ager with my Mom, I thought that continent splendid and stylish. Back in Indiana I digested 
the trip. I suspected there was a psychological mechanism at work, inflating the European 
experience. Europe was on a list and by God I was going to check it off. Stanns Creek was 
also just part--though what a different part-- of  my list!
On the streets, yawning men were rubbing their eyes and straggling into Dorothea’s 
restaurant for Nescafe and hot peppers. Little kids were running this way and that, fetching 
water, slipping in the mud. Broken down cars were everywhere, fleets of  mosquitoes, the 
occasional fat belly sitting in front of  his block house listening to a transistor which buzzed 
with Belize City news. Talk about desolate moments! Talk about the anti-Europe!
I look across at Sam, checking him out. He says nothing. “I’ve seen a world 
stuck at that Stanns Creek level,  in southern Nigeria. Just stuck. Poverty, sure, but 
that’s not it. That’s only the surface. You can be happy with poverty. I’m not talking 
happy or unhappy, just stuck. Paiute stuck. Stuck like that Mexican seaside village 
Graham Greene dissects at the beginning of  The Power and the Glory. Know what I 
mean?” “Know, yup,” says Sam, not quite comfortable. Am I trying out a version 
of  pc on him, implying he comes from a history made of  and by the top dogs? Can 
I reassure him? 
“Sam, I ain’t no friend of  humanity. I’ve just noticed that most of  the world, 
most of  the time,  falls below the level of  an historical account. Of  course it’s not 
quite that simple.  Some crew cut grad student at Princeton will write a dissertation 
on the coastal economies of  Central America, and he’ll spend a year in Stanns 
Creek, and the knowledge factory will grind this bit of  humanity up in its mills. 
But once the momentary knowing process has passed,  it’s like this bit of  humanity 
was never there. Having been known is like having been glanced at one afternoon 
on the street. I’ll say it again”--now he’s starting to squirm—“I ain’t on nobody’s 
side. I’m not p.c. Quite the opposite.  I’m a man of  the Fall--cast a cold eye; curavi, 
humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed intelligere--but what I do know is that 
your orthodox timelines history, which sure as hell won’t include Stanns Creek, is by 
that the weaker. He smiles. It’s like he’s patting my hand. He’s heard it all before? 
He feels he can meet my charge by insisting that the timeliner must select? He sees 
nothing in what I’ve said that throws its weight behind “affective history’’?  
darK prinT, whiTe spaCes
Chronometric time punctuates the void with dark black print and figures to 
match. We concentrate on the black print, of  course, and beam as we add a few new 
subheadings. Certain actions would never be recorded in print, like Jim’s eating a 
fish sandwich at MacDonald’s yesterday, or Assur bani a pal tripping over a log. 
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Chronometric history has a place for such events--it could fit Stanns Creek in--
but has limited interest in them. Why? Is it  because they fall below the limit of  
significance?  Or is that the reason for the lack of  interest? Is the reason that there is 
not time, paper, or evidence enough to fill in all these spaces? Is it that chronometric 
history runs into a limit on its project? When it comes to eventless time--cyclical/
ritual time, the time of  simple endurance--Stanns Creek time--chronometric history 
is mute. 
What, then, about “affective time?” Affective time has no master project. It does not 
aspire to fill in all the blanks, nor does it address the time of  the human past as though it 
were a grid. For affective time Assur bani a pal’s tripping is as historically embedded and 
significant as the dropping of  the Hydrogen bomb on Hiroshima. Breakfast at Dorothea’s 
can not only occupy a central role in affective history,  but can serve as an inception of  
that history,  or a final chapter in a history written from a particular standpoint--that of  a 
Jamaican emigrant who ends up in British Honduras, and goes on to become the proprietor 
of  Dorothea’s. 
        
***
I rag at the guy! “A timeline is useful, like a shopping list. You can determine where you 
are in it, what’s been done and what needs to be checked into. In fact the whole apparatus 
of  humane scholarship, which entered Western culture with positivism, quantification, and 
the search for an undiscoverable wie es eigentlich gewesen ist, has its chief  use as an ordering 
principle, a useful check-in table. We should not ask more of  the bitch than she can give, 
and we should not cry out like Nietzsche, that history rarely gives us anything to help us live 
better. That’s not the job of  history. History has nothing to do with making us better. 
“Playing with time’s arrows is a good way to surround the object of  historical knowledge, 
viewing it now from its not quite yet side, now from its fait accompli side, looking back. Is 
there any incoherence to viewing the future as the creator of  the past, which makes the 
meaning of  the past stage by stage clearer? From the knower’s viewpoint, furthermore, the 
simple romp from one side to the other of  the bow-making process, seeing it now “ahead” 
now “behind,”  is a good strategy for ruffling the hair on the temporal hound. 
“The “play with time’s arrows” intersects the adoption of  “multiple nows,” place-events 
from which we springboard ourselves one way or another through the past. For most of  us, 
most such historical directional sallies are null/categories. I rarely “think of ” Tongan history, 
you rarely think of  the history of  Champaign County, Illinois, where I grew up. Nonetheless 
interest groups spring up--scholarship is a  waltz of  intersecting interest groups--which bring 
tectonic shifts of  attention now here, now there. The unstable now lives its access to former 
nows of  the self, not to mention its access to “restored” former nows of  the past: I can never 
be Dave my Paiute mailman, but I can make trial runs at being his now; just as I can make 
a trial run at being Victor Cousin’s now, as he confronts a text of  Plato. The labile historical 
dimension of  the now founds the glowing cursor of  human consciousness, which lives as a 
restless scan. As the now makes its scanning rounds it surfaces now here, now there, eyeing 
the course of  historical time from every possible angle.
“Coursing the text of  the past, the now consciousness forever stumbles on black holes, 
empty spaces. These spaces are the white page that separates the bolded date-faces in the 
historical timeline. These are spaces where ‘nothing happens,’ where a man sits eating 
peppers outside a café in Stanns Creek at seven in the morning. These spaces occupy most 
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of  the ‘available area’ of  time, and proliferate where recorded time has not yet set its print. 
“Finally, the topic of  the passions. They won’t save the world, but then neither 
will chronometric history, which locks us into the breathless space of  a ‘this has 
been done.’ Affective time will, though, open at now/points and from the life of  the 
knower. As life promptings rise in the midst of  the passions, and rinse themselves 
cleaner with the age and experience of  the historian, there is eventually room for 
the growth of  compassion. And what is that? It is the dry fruit of  the fall, steeped in 
the awareness of  human limit. It may not be true that none deserve our compassion 
more than such as the Paiutes or the British Hondurans of  Stanns Creek, but it is 
true that none receive more of  our hearts that those we find by the side of  the road, 
rejects of  the long march to ‘progress.’”
essay 2
The hisTory oF a house
1. we’re in monemvasia, the Gibraltar like rock off the east Coast of the pelopon-
nesus.  many narrow passages wind through its residential quarter, up and down the 
small town of churches, forts, and private dwellings. i go up to one of these “old houses.” 
i read about it and its part of the town, carbon date its foundations, make sketches of it, 
photograph it. i touch it. i become as familiar as possible with the house. i surround it 
with all my knowing and recording equipment. 
does the historicity of this house--it seems to have been completed on april 6, 1372-
-appear in the list of things i come to know in knowing this house? is there an “histori-
calness” to the house? i don’t mean “does some historical reference enter into things 
i would say to describe the house?” it probably does so enter. i mean: “is there any 
aspect/feature of the house before me that in itself is, or even declares, some temporal 
situation about itself? is there any aspect of what is before me that is historical? There is 
an inscription with a date, but it offers a date rather than temporality itself.” 
historicity doesn’t leave a mark. whatever exists in time is always present, existent 
in time, although it can exist as a “reference to time.”  
2. when i say that the house in front of me was built on the date named in the date 
marker inscription,   have my words about the building’s date no referent? am i just 
talking into the air? my words “about history” have no referent, at least in the corre-
spondence sense of reference; in the sense that a referent is a determinable guarantor 
of the thought or statement; a gold standard against which the thought can be minted.1 
My words about the house’s historicity involve no thought (expression, assumption) 
     1. “The meaning of a statement lies in the fact that it expresses a conceivable (not necessarily existing) state 
of affairs. if an (ostensible) statement does not express a (conceivable) state of affairs, then it has no meaning. 
it is only apparently a statement. if a statement expresses a state of affairs then it is in any event meaningful; 
it is true if this state of affairs exists, false if it does not exist.” pseudoproblems in philosophy, p. 325 in The 
Logical Structure of  the World and Pseudoproblems in Philosophy, Berkeley, l969.
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directed toward the gold standard of  a referent.  Or so it seems. But is this dismissal 
plausible? Is the whole weight of  ordinary language, with its assumptions about tem-
porality and a “real past,” not too powerful to be dismissed?  Isn’t some other meaning 
of  reference of  interest to us here? Isn’t there some other suitable field of  reference, by 
measuring against which I can say that the date indicated on the house is “referring to 
something real?”
When I claim that the house before me was constructed on a certain date in 1372, 
I run into a problem as soon as I try to locate a referent, “out there in history,” to 
which my claim can apply.  What happens if  I refer to myself  as the reference point 
of  the statement? Can I be the guarantor for my own statement about the date of  the 
house’s construction? Isn’t it I who have asserted the date of  the house? Isn’t it I who 
have established and who support the historical reference field--actually the swinging 
rope ladder of  linear history--in terms of  which the house acquires its historicity? Am 
I not the guarantor, the responsable,  of  linear historical time? Doesn’t the date of  the 
house depend on me, who date it, or, the same thing in effect,  who corroborate some 
inherited dating system? Can we take this route to rescuing a meaning for the house’s 
foundation inscription?
This theory of  reference might offer some (cold) comfort to us in our search for a 
grounding of  linear time; for evidence that the historicity of  the Monemvasia house 
can refer to something, can in that sense “mean something.”  This alternate theory pro-
vides a guarantor, you/me, who has drafted the army of  official historians as his/her 
temporal frame makers and frame fillers. A guarantor? Well, yes, a team-player guar-
antor. A guarantor who has bought into the reigning team ethos, the ideational net-
work that constitutes linear history.  Can so many assistants be wrong?  Can I as data-
guarantor not take comfort here? Not feel reassured that Profs X and Y have backed 
up my date-giving, which in turn backs up the presumption of  historicity in the house? 
Maybe, maybe I’ve found a variant defense for the idea of  reference. and found some 
work for the historical nature of  my Monemvasia house to do.  The “cold” in “cold 
comfort” is because of  that bottomless present, across which this whole rope-ladder of  
time has been extended--by me.  I may have team support in my enterprise, but that 
doesn’t mean we couldn’t all fall through the bottom together. The reference-estab-
lishing drama could be as simple as the following: while falling through the bottom of  
existence,  a man stretches a rope of  time above him,  with which he can pull himself  
back up out of  the pit. The linear historical past is a highly respectable fiction, which is 
created by a man standing in a well.  
3. Let’s go back to that house at Monemvasia. Let’s talk about what was indubita-
bly present there, what I found when I approached the house, reading about it, making 
sketches of  it,  carbon dating it. There was a formation of  matter, which appears in var-
ious transformations of  the house’s physical/chemical structure.  This matter, like the 
linear rope ladder “history” I want to attach it to, is also a construct. It does not contain 
its meaning in itself. To evaluate the meaning of  this matter I require a referent, as much 
as I require one when I conceive of  the historicity of  the house.  The matter may have 
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a life of  its own, which it occupies without me. But when I appear, the matter takes on 
meaning. It becomes some kind of  matter; that is it acquires meaning by being related 
to what it deeply is. Yet I don’t see or touch what underlies this matter, what defines the 
matter, the underlying physical/chemical structure. It’s true that before me I see color, 
shape, a corner of  lintel, a dissymmetrical gray cornice. The ever morphing physical-
chemical underlying structure is in a sense making itself  into what I see. But I cannot get 
behind the phenomena of  that matter, to its own ground.  Perhaps the house’s material 
grounding is guaranteed by me/you from the same bottomless pit of  the present, which 
assured the grounding energies of  linear time. The underlying physical structure of  the 
Monemvasia house may lay claim to existing, every nano second, at a different point 
in the continuum of  linear history; but only because that physical (like the temporal) 
structure is sustained by me and you who conceive it.  It has been said that fundamental 
nature, the elemental of  physics,  is always in the year one, accumulates no time around 
it; if  so, that would be a state in which nature enjoys the company of  linear “history,” 
which like nature is a construct.
4. Nature, like history, is sustained by an imperiled guarantor. Can I serve as mate-
rial nature’s referent? Of  course. I can father matter, as I fathered time.  But in that case 
what do the atoms and their nuclei mean apart from my naming-guarantee of  them? 
What kind of  fathering is this? What are the elementary physics particles in my account 
except my account drained of  my account, until all that is left is what my account was 
about? 
5. Keep me in front of that house in monemvasia, or in front of what’s left of it--after 
we’ve unplugged it from nature and time, and plugged it into ourselves. what’s left of 
it is exactly what was there before i started asking what kind of historicity of  the house 
would survive analysis. i pretended that the survivor, among historical and material ac-
counts, might be myself--humanity the namer--sustaining the accounts both of the his-
tory of human  affairs, and of the history of molecular affairs within the house. did i 
deprive the house, or the history of the house, of anything, by taking over from it this 
guarantor or reference role? did my undermining of conventional historical or physi-
cal analysis do anything to the house which is standing there opposite me? The house 
still seems to be there. i can touch it and think about it and write about it. i can hit my 
head against it.  i can ask when it was built and what it was built of. have the accounts 
of which the house’s authorship has been denied not been essential parts of the house 
itself? 
6. Both matter and accounts of temporal interactions with it seem built to survive 
being interpreted away. so i’m the guarantor of historical time and the micro- structure 
of nature? me and my fellow namers, fellow human analysts? Big deal! maybe “guar-
anteeing,” “giving accounts” is not such a powerful establishing act. are we giving the 
guaranteeing-account its due? should we consider alternative ways of interpreting the 
account itself?  should we, like some postmodernists,  take the turn of prioritizing the 
account,  of insisting that all is account,  all our talk about the world a kind of narrative.2 
     2. derrida turns to a passage from montaigne--“il y a plus affaire à interpréter les interprétations qu’à 
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(After that level of  demystification, all that would remain would be to attach the ac-
counter to a super accounter; God? And God to…? There would be no point of  rest in 
the regression, which however conceals the threat of  becoming infinite.) We might have 
made a move that could have led toward the postmodern.  That would have been the 
beginning of  one strategy for recovering the validity of  our accounts, for fighting off  the 
insulting suggestion that our accounts were impotent. But going that close to the post-
modern, in accounting for the account, would mean something we are not up for here: 
saving the reliability of   language or other symbol systems by decentering them,  by 
making all accounts into new versions. To follow that saving move would mean agreeing 
that the efforts to name the historical or the micro-atomic, of  the building at Monemva-
sia, are cut off  from the designatum by the gap between explanation and designatum, 
are forever giving fresh accounts and themselves becoming subjects of  new accounts. 
The accounting enterprise would be turned into a game of  infinite regress, making a 
mockery of  the existential stakes put in play by our effort to  know. 
Let’s recap. Recourse to the guarantee-establishing self  leaves much to be desired as 
an account of  the source of  our descriptive systems. But we need to remember the dis-
tress that led us to our recourse.  We could not find the “historical” or the “physical” 
element in the Monemvasia house itself, because there was no foundation for either of  
those descriptive categories. That’s why we brought in the self  as guarantor.  But we 
didn’t want to commit, thereby,  to the total “unknowability” or “unnameability” of  
the house- object. We didn’t want to remove the house from the world. We balked at 
the particular notion that all is an account. That premise seemed to dissolve into end-
less language skeins the legitimate desire to know the house/object in question. We only 
wanted to make it difficult to explain how that notion was not completely satisfactory. 
7.  We are talking about getting to know an object in time. How do we know the 
temporal placement of  the House in Monemvasia? We have slashed at the roots from 
which grows the tall tree of  linear history. We are also talking about getting to know a 
object in space, an object in its material presence. Yet we have slashed at the roots from 
which the space tree grows: the supposed hard reality of  matter-filled space. We have at 
the same time, while attacking the solidity of  the self  as guarantor, raised serious doubts 
about even that last-resort gold standard for historicity. Are we not left with a universe in 
which a surprising perspective forces itself  on us, a perspective in which such attributes 
as the spatial or temporal dimension of  things can only be understood as the not-yet-
named or the not-yet-knowable? Cannot the history of  the House in Monemvasia be 
best thought of, after all,  as “to be added”? Are these negative compounds--the not-
yet-named, the-not-yet knowable--going to be our wonder path out through the bush, 
into what is once again the light of  truly denotative statement?  Are we going to settle 
for a kind of  apophatic epistemology, in which not knowing, or being in process toward 
knowing,  is the only way to know?
interpréter les choses”--to herald his essay, “la structure, le signe et le Jeu dans le discours des sciences hu-
maines” (1966; in L’Ecriture et la différence, paris, 1967; pp. 409-428.) in that essay derrida uses the centrality 
of accounting as part of his fine tuning of structuralism, and of his analysis of the work of the bricoleur.
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So it may be, and at such a point we may indeed now find ourselves, in our quest for 
an historical and spatial field of  reference, yet there is more to say about this perspective 
that has forced itself  on us. We have not only discovered a realm of  the not-yet-named 
and  not-yet-knowable, but we have come upon a crucial distinction which needs to be 
made between two kinds of  not-yet-named and not-yet-knowable. We need to agree 
on exactly which kind of  knowing process we are making a place for. On the one hand 
there is the not-yet named which negates globally,  which negates the class of  all those 
things, like things with temporal or spatial tags, which cannot be named.  This kind of  
not-yet-named oversees the entire expanse of  knowing and designating.  This not-yet-
named is “all of  the above” when it comes to what temporal or spatial element is dis-
proportionate to whatever we might want to call it. Then there is the not-yet-named, 
not-yet-known which is the obverse of  particular objects or event-horizons, which is the 
shadow inside reality of  “things,” the coat those things are seen from the inside of  its 
tailoring. This is the not-yet-named that holds descriptive promise for our need to name, 
to date in historical time or to plumb physically. We need to name the precise inside of  
what we cannot name. We need and want to name the specific not-named.  
Let’s go back to the house in Monemvasia. It has a date, it is composed of  this or 
that material, it is of  this or that form; all nameable, datable, all knowable--though in 
fact, as we’ve tried agreeing to see, the house appears,  precisely in the acts of  being 
known or named, to be itself  not what the knowing or naming would have it be. There 
is no elementary particle structure or temporal designation to be named in the house. 
The house itself  is not anything you can name or know, although it is precisely, and in 
congruence with its specific nature. The house is the way the house is precisely what you 
can’t name  or know. The two halves of  that discrepancy fit each other exactly,  as in the 
fine work of  a tailor the outside and the inside of  a coat fit each other exactly.
8.  Naming and dating accounts are seen to be byproducts of  the ever vanishing 
self  of  the moment. These accounts include both a global panorama of  the not-known 
or not-named in general--the unnameable universe; and a panorama of  all the spe-
cific not-yet named, not-yet-knowable shadow obverses of  all the specifics naming and 
knowing could not embrace. It is this second panorama which promises to legitimate at 
least a very precise kind of  naming/not-naming. The insinuation: the intelligible life of  a 
thing or person or concept--a nameable or numerable-- lies along the fault line between the nomenclature 
of  that entity and its shadow obverse, the silence that underlies it.  It is that shadow intelligibility 
that we can approach to name. 
9. Let’s return to the house in Monemvasia. Before me it stands, before it I stand. 
From a point in myself  I can confer a time-marker, a style development marker, a ma-
terial composition marker--appointing to each aspect of  the house its term and coor-
dinates. The house itself--much as we have highlighted it, by standing before it and 
knowing/dating/analyzing it--is in this whole experience only as an unnamable which 
is unique to this particular act of  not knowing/ knowing or not naming/ naming. No 
wonder the house remaining there is in some sense “silence,”  secure in its awareness 
that I or you can only know it as this house you or I cannot know.
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10. What, then, is discourse about the nature of  things in the world, and about the 
placing we give them in the world?   In An Essay on Man (1944),3 Ernst Cassirer argues 
that mankind is before all a symbol-maker. Cassirer recapitulates some then current 
comparative studies of  ape/human mental development, and concludes that human 
advances in the sciences and arts, in social development, in speculation are all derived 
from our superior capacity to handle symbols. That was seventy-five years ago.  We no 
longer formulate the denoting process in the manner of  Cassirer or Suzanne Langer. 
But even in a more recent cultural movement like Postmodernism, the belief  remains 
that what-is is nameable. The pre-established harmony between naming and named 
may undergo scrutiny. Accounting may be consigned to a process of  infinite regress. 
There may be much talk about decentering and slippage (mou). But that naming and 
named are in a ballet of  correspondence with one another is not questioned. Naming 
acts have termini, which are at the same time morphs into fresh reference.4 Unlike Cas-
sirer and, say, Jacques Derrida, I am engaging a view which butts forcefully against the 
assumptions of  the “symbolizers.” I lean to the view that what is there to name, date, 
or locate is not to be designated by language or other symbol systems.  I am dubious of  
the power of  homo symbolicus, even of  man the decenterer.   I have isolated an object-
surrogate which can be named, but it is only a surrogate, and to read by its light is to 
read “in negative territory.”  
Am I drifting toward a doctrine of  silence?
11. Silence? The denotative meaning of  the Monemvasia house, in front of  which 
I stand, crashes against the object itself…fecklessly. Ensured by the obverse coverage of  
it, by the meanings addressing it, the house not-nameable, not-datable, not-placeable 
hunkers like an alternate universe inside the meaning that seeks it. The silence in ques-
tion, surrounding the house, is the silence unique to the house in question, and not a 
fractal of  that undifferentiated ocean of  silence in which we have our being, as a sus-
taining condition of  our reality; or to which the inward human turns as to a source. 
The parallel silent universe of  which we speak  is not the “rich silence of  being,” but 
the implicit obverse of  denotation. If  we called this silence “logical silence,” an “inevi-
table interior predication,” we would be closer to the principle in question, than if  we 
enriched our discussion.
This logical silence carries with it no mandates. It doesn’t change or shape our 
world, because “our world” has no need of  our silence; “our world” is by nature satis-
fied with the representations of  reality that facilitate our social comforts, our explorative 
     3. Cassirer, an Essay on Man (new haven, l944), p. 24: “Between the receptor system and the effector 
system, which  are to be found in all animal species, we find in man a third link, which we may describe as 
the symbolic system. This new acquisition transforms the whole of human life. as compared with the other 
animals man lives not merely in a broader reality; he lives, so to speak, in a new dimension of reality.”
     4. i dealt with this issue of language and its relation to the named, in an early essay, “From naming to 
Fiction making,” giornale di Metafisica, 1958, XVi, 569-583.  That essay takes up the issue of the mimetic 
factor in works of literary art. are those works “about” anything? i pursue the quest, for a convincing 
description of “how we name”, in The Fact of  Literature (amsterdam, 1973). The evolving personal shadow of 
these studies, leading toward the perspectives of the present essay, can be traced in Frank shynnagh’s Song 
Broken, Song: The Work of  Frederic Will (mellen, 2008).
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adventures, our capacity to seek and receive help. Still the logical silence in question 
here exercises its own unremitting pressures. This silence guarantees that we can live 
ourselves under the illusory sign of  cosmic adjustment.   
12. The secret life of  what cannot yet be named or known, by our designations, 
except that…it is as though our designations derived from attaching a mathematical 
negative to all our efforts to name.   Have we here a key to entering this undisclosed 
negative universe? Just add the negative sign?
The yes we answer is our sign of  solidarity with the life-giving ever-implicit. What 
can better sustain our enterprise of  thinking and naming, the life that defines us as 
humans, than the negative reserved meaning our sign-systems imply? 
We return to the house on its street in Monemvasia. We have been raised on the dif-
ficulties of   “knowing” such an object. What does that knowing mean? What is it we are 
hungry for? We derive an answer from the kind of  difficulty the knowledge object has, 
in fulfilling itself. The knowledge object swims before the interpretations of  it. It is the 
interpretations of  it. The realm of  silent logic is where the energy of  statement resides. 
The realm of  silent logic is the birthplace of  the life-giving negative. 
13. What can we learn by thinking of  our life-point as the intersection between de-
notative sallies and the silence implicit in them? We can enrich our pleasure in the in-
completeness of  our role, as “introducers of  the symbol,” and meaningful actors in the 
world.  Far from “realizing ourselves,” by flowing outward into anyone’s symbol-mak-
ing  account of  us, we can condemn ourselves willingly to the human strain of  silence. 
Cassirer salutes man’s symbol making powers as a source of  human achievement. Even 
Derrida, though radically recasting the strategies of  language use, avoids doubting the 
value of  the symbol system itself.5 5  I am doubting that value, flying in the face not only 
of  the mandarins of  language analysis and use, but of  evolutionary biology, given as it 
is to seeing survival value in  human symbol systems.  I am trying to put the negative in 
that place of  honor it deserves, governor as it is of  the province of  silence. 
Frederic Will 
School of  Advanced Studies 
University of  Phoenix
     5. For derrida, the writer is the language user par excellence, and derrida dissolves the observer/observed 
view of the writer/world relationship. derrida substitutes for that view the idea of the writer as written by 
the world. “Le sujet de l’écriture n’existe pas si l’on entend par là quelque solitude souveraine de l’écrivain.  Le sujet de 
l’écriture est un système de rapports entre les couches: du bloc magique, du psychique, de la société, du monde.” (L’écriture 
et la différence, p. 335, paris, l967). yet there is here no radical questioning of the symbolic effectiveness of 
language.
